The Lone Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other Fictions: A Comment on Connick v. Thompson by Bandes, Susan A.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 2 Article 11 
November 2011 
The Lone Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other 
Fictions: A Comment on Connick v. Thompson 
Susan A. Bandes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Susan A. Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other Fictions: A Comment on 
Connick v. Thompson, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 715 (2011). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol80/iss2/11 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 715 
THE LONE MISCREANT, THE SELF-TRAINING 
PROSECUTOR, AND OTHER FICTIONS:  
A COMMENT ON CONNICK V. THOMPSON 
Susan A. Bandes*
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Connick v. Thompson,1 the U.S. Supreme Court blocked one of the 
last remaining paths to prosecutorial accountability for the violation of 
constitutionally mandated discovery obligations under Brady v. Maryland.2  
Two terms ago in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,3 the Court expanded the scope 
of absolute immunity for individual prosecutors to encompass supervisory 
failures to train, supervise, or institute programs to comply with Brady.4  
The upshot of Connick v. Thompson is that now, unless non-compliance is 
frequent and notorious enough to reach the level of custom, prosecutors’ 
offices are insulated from § 19835
The Connick decision has attracted notice mainly for its compelling facts.  
Plaintiff John Thompson spent eighteen years in prison, fourteen of them on 
death row, for a crime he did not commit.
 liability—entity as well as individual—
for failing to comply with Brady.  The decision also bodes ill for 
prosecutorial accountability more generally, and for failure to train liability 
across the board. 
6  Beginning prior to Thompson’s 
trial in 1985, the team engaged in prosecuting Thompson for the New 
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office—Eric Dubelier,7
 
*  Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, The University of Miami School of 
Law.  I owe thanks to Don Doernberg and Robert Mosteller for extremely helpful comments 
on an earlier draft, to Michael Kozik, University of Miami Law School Class of 2013, for 
excellent research assistance, and to Tom Lee and the Fordham Law Review for organizing a 
superb symposium. 
 Jim Williams, 
 1. 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 2. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Brady v. Maryland imposes on prosecutors a constitutional 
obligation to share exculpatory evidence with the defense. See id. at 87. 
 3. 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009). 
 4. See id. at 864–65. 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 6. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355.  The verdict in Van de Kamp similarly left Thomas 
Goldstein with no remedy for prosecutorial misconduct that led to his spending twenty-four 
years in prison on a conviction that was ultimately reversed, leading to his release. See Van 
de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 859; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Head in the Sand over 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 25, 2011) http://www.law.com/
jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202491215314 (noting that in Van de Kamp, “the Court 
dismissed a suit against prosecutors by a man who spent 24 years in prison for a murder that 
he did not commit”). 
 7. Eric Dubelier is District Attorney Harry Connick, Sr.’s third in command. 
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Gerry Deegan, and Bruce Whittaker—concealed from both Thompson and 
from the courts exculpatory evidence that it was constitutionally required to 
produce.8  In 1994, Deegan, who was terminally ill, confessed to Assistant 
District Attorney (A.D.A.) Michael Riehlmann that he had suppressed 
blood evidence in Thompson’s armed robbery case, and Riehlmann too 
joined in the conspiracy of silence.9  The evidence that would exonerate 
Thompson was discovered, fortuitously, by his own private investigator just 
before he was about to be executed in 2003.10  A jury awarded Thompson 
$14 million for his wrongful incarceration and time on death row.11
As Thompson himself emphasized after the verdict, it is not only about 
the money.
  The 
Court’s decision in Connick vacates that award and leaves Thompson 
without a remedy for the violation of his constitutional rights. 
12
Dahlia Lithwick called Connick “one of the meanest Supreme Court 
decisions ever.”
  Section 1983 serves a declaratory and deterrent function as 
well as a compensatory one, and Connick limits access to the full panoply 
of § 1983 remedies.  The decision sends a deeply unfortunate message 
about both the government’s duty to prevent prosecutorial misconduct and 
the Court’s duty to acknowledge, remedy, and prevent egregious harms. 
13  The opinion is “mean” not only in the sense in which she 
uses the word—coldhearted and without acknowledgement of the human 
costs of the government’s wrongdoing14
This Article focuses on the atomization of official conduct in Connick:  
how it is accomplished, and at what costs to the aims of § 1983 and 
governmental accountability.  First, it challenges the central assumption on 
which Justice Thomas relied in vacating the opinion below—that 
Thompson’s harm can be traced to only a single incident of governmental 
—but also in its grudging 
interpretation of the constitutional violation at issue, its reductionist notions 
of what a training regime can accomplish, and its stark indifference to the 
deterrent, compensatory, and declaratory aims of § 1983.  Connick reveals 
the relentlessly atomistic lens through which the current Court views 
governmental obligations—both those of the prosecutor and those of the 
Court itself. 
 
 8. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1370–72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 9. See id. at 1368 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 10. See id. at 1375 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 11. See id. at 1355–56 (majority opinion). 
 12. Thompson’s actual words were:  “I don’t care about the money.” John Thompson, 
Op-Ed., The Prosecution Rests, but I Can’t, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2011, at WK11.  He went 
on to say that what he did care about was why there have been no repercussions of any kind 
for the prosecutors involved in his case.  In addition, he pointed out that “[o]f the six men 
one of my prosecutors got sentenced to death, five eventually had their convictions reversed 
because of prosecutorial misconduct.” Id.  The misconduct came to light because these were 
capital cases and lawyers were appointed on appeal.  “[T]here are more than 4,000 people 
serving life without parole in Louisiana, almost none of whom have lawyers after their 
convictions are final.” Id. 
 13. Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel but Not Unusual, SLATE (Apr. 1, 2011, 7:43 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2290036/. 
 14. See also Editorial, Failure of Empathy and Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, at 
A26. 
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misconduct by a lone miscreant.  To the contrary, the violation at issue was 
a group effort, as well as a reflection of a longstanding culture of disregard 
for Brady in Connick’s office.  Second, the article critiques the Court’s 
conception of training.  It argues that the majority misconceives the nature 
and purpose of training prosecutors, and that there are characteristics that 
inhere in prosecutorial culture in particular and organizational culture more 
generally that make training essential.  Finally, it argues that the Court’s 
atomistic vision of § 1983 and of its own role in remedying constitutional 
wrongs is at odds with the aims of the statute it sets out to construe. 
I.  HOW DOES A D.A.’S OFFICE CAUSE A DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS? 
Connick grapples with the question that has vexed the Court in municipal 
liability cases since it first permitted § 1983 suits against governmental 
entities15:  what does it mean for wrongdoing to be attributable to—or 
caused by—a municipality?16  Section 1983 provides a remedy when the 
defendant “subject[ed]” the plaintiff, or “cause[d] [the plaintiff] to be 
subjected . . . to [a] deprivation of [constitutional] rights.”17
Since the decision in Monell, the Court has struggled to draw the line 
between the respondeat superior liability that it has held the statute 
prohibits, and the supervisory liability it has held the statute permits.
  Since agencies 
can act only through their agents, the Monell v. Department of Social 
Services of New York line of cases requires a determination of whether what 
happened to Thompson was attributable to the official capacity acts of the 
D.A.’s office, or to the independent acts of one or two or five bad apples 
who deviated from official policy in a way that could not have been 
reasonably foreseen or prevented. 
18
A.  Municipal Liability for Failure to Train, Supervise, or Discipline 
  The 
Court has been especially wary of imposing liability on the entity based on 
a claim that a wrongdoer’s acts are attributable to something the entity 
failed to do—train, supervise, or discipline subordinates.  Yet failure to 
train liability is essential.  Without it, municipal liability is in danger of 
becoming a mere form of words.  Unsurprisingly, explicitly illegal policies 
are rarely put in place.  An insistence that liability flows only from an 
explicit policy essentially immunizes policymakers who simply adopt a 
facially constitutional policy, or institute no policy at all, and then fail to 
prevent or implicitly condone unconstitutional conduct. 
To guard against the slippery slope scenario it fears, in which every 
wrongful act of a subordinate can be linked to some failure of the 
policymaker, the Court has created high hurdles to establishing failure to 
train liability.  It requires the plaintiff to show that the need for the training 
 
 15. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 16. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 477–80 (1986); City of Oklahoma 
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985) (plurality opinion); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 18. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691–95. 
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was obvious, so that failing to train under the circumstances demonstrated 
“deliberate indifference to the rights of [those with whom the untrained 
employees] come into contact,”19 and that the failure to adequately train 
was the moving force behind the resulting violation of rights.20  Yet prior to 
Connick, failure to train liability could under certain circumstances be 
established through proof of the actions or inactions of the policymaker 
himself, even absent a pattern of low-level violations of rights.21
Substantial confusion has been caused by the question of the probative 
value of a single incident of wrongful conduct.  Much of this confusion 
arises from a failure to distinguish single decisions by policymaking 
officials (which can lead to liability) from single wrongful actions by 
subordinates (which, standing alone, cannot lead to liability).  In Pembaur 
v. City of Cincinnati,
  
Alternatively, failure to train liability could be proved through custom—if 
enough violations by subordinates occur on the policymaker’s watch, he is 
on constructive notice that whatever he is doing is not working properly.  
The former avenue—proof of actions or inactions by the policymaker 
himself—is now narrowed, perhaps to the vanishing point. 
22 the Court held that a single decision by a 
policymaking official could give rise to municipal liability, since it 
establishes the requisite causal link between the decision and the 
violation.23  In City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,24 the Court declined to infer 
inadequate policies from a single incident by a low-level employee—an 
unjustified fatal shooting—without independent evidence of failures at the 
policy level that may have led to that incident.25  The Tuttle Court held that 
a policy of failure to train must be shown to have resulted from the 
deliberate choice of an inadequate training program by policymakers.26  But 
it recognized that if proof of such a policy of inadequate training did exist, 
and an affirmative link between that policy and an unconstitutional 
deprivation of rights could be shown, the policy did not need to lead to 
more than one unconstitutional deprivation to be actionable.27
In City of Canton v. Harris,
 
28
 
 19. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 
 the Court again emphasized that the key to 
municipal liability is the causal link between some action of the 
policymaker and the resulting injury.  It held that a municipality may cause 
a deprivation by providing inadequate training in a situation in which the 
need for better training is “so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result 
in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymaker[’]s” failure to 
 20. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 407 (1997); Canton, 489 
U.S. at 388–90. 
 21. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404, 407; Canton, 489 U.S. at 388–90. 
 22. 475 U.S. 469 (1986). 
 23. See id. at 480. 
 24. 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (plurality opinion). 
 25. See id. at 823–24. 
 26. See id. at 823. 
 27. See id. at 823–24. 
 28. 489 U.S. 378 (1989). 
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provide that training amounts to deliberate indifference.29  In a footnote, it 
provided an example of such a situation:  a police department that arms its 
officers and then fails to train them on the constitutional limits on their use 
of deadly force when apprehending fleeing felons.30
In sum, municipal liability for failure to train could, prior to Connick, be 
established in two ways:  either through evidence that the policymaker had 
a policy of failure to train, or through evidence of a pattern of violations by 
subordinates, from which it could be inferred that the policymaker should 
have known of the need for more effective training.  Before Connick, it had 
never been the rule that a policymaking official was allowed a few “free” 
violations, or even one free violation, before he could be held liable.  The 
Court recognized that in some cases a failure to provide such training could 
establish the policymaker’s deliberate indifference even if it led to only a 
single claim of constitutional harm, as in the fleeing felon situation 
described in Canton.
  Canton, like Tuttle, 
made it clear that had there been independent proof of a failure to train of 
the sort that was likely to lead to the deprivation at issue, the fact that only 
one such deprivation resulted would not prevent a finding of municipal 
liability. 
31
B.  Failure to Train Liability Based on Policy, Not Custom 
 
Connick argued that a Brady violation is not akin to the fleeing felon 
situation described in Canton—that it is not sufficiently obvious that the 
failure to train prosecutors about their Brady obligations will lead to Brady 
violations.32  He argued that therefore municipal liability for failure to train 
prosecutors about their discovery responsibilities should never lie for what 
he called a “single incident”;33 that liability cannot lie unless there is a 
pattern of Brady violations.34  The Thomas majority enthusiastically 
embraced this argument.  It held that no amount of independent proof of 
deliberate indifference to the need to train prosecutors about their Brady 
violations can suffice.  The office can be held liable only upon proof of a 
pattern of constitutional violations obvious enough35 to come to the 
policymaker’s notice.36
 
 29. See id. at 390. 
 
 30. Id. at 390 n.10. 
 31. Id. at 390; see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997). 
 32. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1357–58 (2011). 
 33. Id. at 1360–61.  For more on the incorrect characterization of the “single incident,” 
see infra Part II. 
 34. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1366. 
 35. See id. at 1359–60.  It does not specify how these violations would come to the 
policymaker’s notice.  This is a particularly troubling question in a situation where the harm 
is a failure to turn over evidence; something that by its nature is difficult to discover, 
particularly when no monitoring system is required to be put in place. See Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 443–44 (1976) (White, J., concurring). 
 36. The Court is on the brink of holding that except in the very narrow situation 
described in Canton—arming police without training them on deadly force—municipal 
policymakers are insulated from liability for failure to train until that failure can be causally 
linked to a pattern of unconstitutional conduct obvious enough to come to their actual or 
720 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
In this case there was substantial independent evidence that Connick not 
only should have been but was in fact on notice that he was providing 
inadequate training on a core prosecutorial function.  Essentially he 
provided no formal training, no formal supervision, and a clearly 
communicated policy of presumptive non-disclosure unless required by 
law, coupled with a lack of guidance, or in some cases misinformation, on 
what was required by law.  Unsurprisingly, there was substantial evidence 
that this approach led to persistent “misperception and disregard of Brady’s 
disclosure requirements.”37
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg observed: 
 
Unquestionably, a municipality that leaves police officers untrained in 
constitutional limits on the use of deadly weapons places lives in 
jeopardy.  But as this case so vividly shows, a municipality that empowers 
prosecutors to press for a death sentence without ensuring that those 
prosecutors know and honor Brady rights may be no less “deliberately 
indifferent” to the risk to innocent lives.38
II.  THE LONE MISCREANT RIDES AGAIN:  
CRAFTING A “SINGLE INCIDENT” NARRATIVE 
 
[T]here weren’t four instances.  There was one Brady violation that 
possibly could have involved one to four prosecutors.39
The Connick opinion holds that a district attorney’s office may not be 
held liable under § 1983 for failure to train its prosecutors based on a single 
Brady violation.
 
40  It is important to take a step back at this juncture and 
ask:  in what sense is this series of acts by at least five prosecutors41
 
constructive notice.  Connick’s reasoning that prosecutors can train and regulate themselves 
certainly seems to insulate prosecutors’ offices from entity liability for failure to train on any 
constitutional violation, since the argument for the need to train assistant prosecutors on their 
Brady obligations is particularly strong.  Whether the reasoning insulates entities other than 
prosecutors’ offices from failure to train liability absent a pattern of misconduct is a more 
difficult issue.  Arguably the opinion’s reasoning relies heavily on the ability of prosecutors, 
as legal professionals, to train and regulate themselves.  However, there is language in both 
the majority and concurring opinions to suggest that the Canton “failure to train on deadly 
force” example is no longer to be considered an illustration of a situation in which failure to 
train liability can lie based on deliberate indifference, absent a pattern of unconstitutional 
subordinate conduct; rather, it is now to be regarded as the sole situation in which such 
liability is available. See, e.g., Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1367 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Were 
Thompson’s theory the law, there would have been no need for Canton’s footnote to confine 
its hypothetical to the extreme circumstance of arming police officers with guns without 
[training] them about the . . . limitations upon shooting fleeing felons.” (emphasis added)). 
 over a 
period of more than eighteen years a single incident?  Not in the sense that 
it was a rogue, unforeseeable act by a subordinate that could not fairly be 
 37. 131 S. Ct. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. at 1385 (citation omitted). 
 39. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) 
(No. 09-571), 2010 WL 3907898, at *23 (statement of Stuart K. Duncan, representing 
Connick). 
 40. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356 (majority opinion). 
 41. See id. at 1384 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that four prosecutors worked 
together on prosecuting Thompson, and a fifth was the recipient of Gerry Deegan’s deathbed 
confession). 
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ascribed to the actions of the policymaker—only in the sense that it 
culminated in the wrongful conviction and near execution of only a single 
man. 
  As I have argued elsewhere, courts display a persistent tendency to 
portray governmental misconduct as isolated rather than as part of a larger 
pattern.  When judges are faced with allegations of governmental 
misconduct, they must make choices about what factors are relevant or 
important, what causal links exist between various acts, and whether to 
categorize incidents as isolated or part of a pattern.42  Judges make these 
choices in light of assumptions about the underlying constitutional and 
statutory values at issue, and more generally, about how various types of 
actors ought to behave and how the world works.43
The story of a few bad apples in an otherwise pristine barrel is both 
comforting and seductive.  It conforms to standard narrative conventions of 
good and evil actors, a focus on action rather than inaction, easy causal 
links, a clear moral, and a simple and satisfying dénouement.  When 
governmental wrongdoing is at issue, the story also serves to reassure that 
the world is just and that the forces of crime and chaos will be reliably 
reined in by a benign government.  The Connick majority and concurring 
opinions dramatically illustrate how judges portray wrongful conduct as the 
fault of one or two malevolent actors rather than as the product of systemic 
dysfunction.
 
44  In an office described as having “one of the worst Brady 
records in the country,”45 one bad apple was held entirely to blame.  The 
lone “miscreant,”46
 
 42. See Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice:  Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1275, 1275 (1999). 
 Gerry Deegan, died in 1994, and in any case would 
have been absolutely immune from suit under Van de Kamp.  Thus no one 
is held accountable for withholding evidence that kept an innocent man in 
prison for eighteen years and nearly led to his wrongful execution.  
Moreover, in the majority’s view, no systemic changes are in order.  How 
did this egregious wrongdoing, in which several assistant prosecutors 
participated, in an office notorious for its discovery abuses both by the 
policymaker and by his subordinates, end up on the shoulders of one man, 
long dead?  As I will describe, for the Court to place the blame solely on 
Deegan’s shoulders and to exonerate Connick’s office required it to 
disaggregate a complex pattern of official misconduct at every conceivable 
 43. I have elsewhere discussed in detail many of the assumptions that underlie the 
courts’ tendency to disaggregate governmental misconduct.  These include selective 
empathy (in this case a strong identification with the forces of law and order), the 
assumption that the status quo is just and fair, fear of the chaos that will ensue if liability is 
available, and a preference for individual stories of motive, fault, and blame over complex 
stories of a series of interlocking decisions, often made in good faith. See id. at 1317–40; see 
also Susan Bandes, Tracing the Pattern of No Pattern:  Stories of Police Brutality, 34 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 665 (2001). 
 44. See Bandes, supra note 42, at 1330. 
 45. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1384 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 1368 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The withholding of evidence in [Thompson’s] 
case was almost certainly caused . . . by miscreant prosecutor Gerry Deegan’s willful 
suppression of evidence he believed to be exculpatory . . . .”). 
722 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
juncture.  Illustrating the mechanics of disaggregation in this case requires a 
quick overview of the facts. 
A.  Factual Background:  How Thompson Was Convicted of Two Felonies 
He Did Not Commit 
Thompson was convicted of two separate crimes he did not commit:  
both an armed robbery and a murder.47  He served eighteen years in prison, 
fourteen of them on death row, and narrowly escaped execution.  As 
discussed earlier, four assistant prosecutors worked together on the 
Thompson prosecutions and deliberately withheld and concealed blood 
evidence that would have exonerated Thompson in his armed robbery 
case—an undisputed violation of Brady v. Maryland.48  The robbery 
conviction led, by design, to Thompson’s inability to take the stand in his 
own defense in the murder case, allowing the actual perpetrator’s testimony 
to stand uncontradicted.  The office had deliberately tried Thompson first 
for the robbery, though it occurred after the murder, in order to disable him 
from testifying.  The armed robbery also provided the statutory aggravating 
factor that made the murder death-eligible and ultimately put Thompson on 
death row.  The prosecution argued in closing at Thompson’s murder trial 
that “[b]ecause [he] was already serving a near-life sentence for attempted 
armed robbery . . . the only way to punish him for murder was to execute 
him.”49  Thompson was sentenced to death.50
Over the eighteen years that Thompson was imprisoned, the D.A.’s office 
never turned over the Brady material.  As discussed above, it was ultimately 
discovered by one of Thompson’s own investigators less than a month 
before Thompson was to be executed.  After this fortuitous discovery, it 
came to light that in 1994, nine years after Thompson’s trial and five years 
before his execution date, A.D.A. Gerry Deegan had confessed on his 
deathbed to another A.D.A., Michael Riehlmann, that he had (according to 
Riehlmann’s later report) intentionally withheld the blood evidence.  
Riehlmann kept this knowledge to himself until the blood evidence was 
uncovered by Thompson’s investigator in 1999.
 
51
Thus there is evidence that five or more attorneys had been part of the 
failure to turn over evidence or had a hand in covering it up.
 
52
 
 47. Id. at 1355 (majority opinion). 
  The D.A.’s 
office vacated the robbery conviction in light of the exposure of the 
exculpatory blood evidence, but chose, after Thompson’s murder 
conviction was reversed, to retry him on the murder charge.  In Thompson’s 
retrial not only did he testify in his own defense, he gained access to 
 48. But see id. at 1368–69 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that prosecutors had no duty 
to turn over blood evidence because they did not know—having determined that they would 
not inquire into—the suspect’s blood type).  Justice Ginsburg in dissent refers to this as a 
“‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ view of a prosecutor’s Brady obligations [that] garners no support 
from precedent.” Id. at 1373 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 1374 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. at 1374–75. 
 52. See id. at 1384. 
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thirteen pieces of evidence that Connick’s office had failed to turn over 
during his first trial, including information that an eyewitness had received 
a monetary award, and a police report in which the main eyewitness had 
given a description inconsistent with his trial testimony, both essential tools 
for impeaching crucial inculpatory testimony.53  At retrial the jury acquitted 
Thompson in thirty-five minutes.54  In his subsequent § 1983 suit, a jury 
found that Connick’s failure to train his assistants about their Brady 
obligations caused the deprivation of Thompson’s rights.  It awarded 
Thompson $14 million, a verdict upheld by the Fifth Circuit and left in 
place by an evenly divided en banc court.55  Connick v. Thompson 
overturned that award,56
B.  The Question of Actual or Constructive Notice that Brady Training Was 
Necessary 
 leaving Thompson with no remedy for his 
constitutional injury. 
The operative question is whether Connick should have been on notice 
that his office had a problem with Brady training and compliance that was 
likely to lead to Brady violations if unaddressed.  To find that no such 
constructive notice existed, the Court portrayed a complex and persistent 
pattern of misconduct not merely as a series of isolated, disconnected acts 
of misconduct, but as a single act of misconduct.  First, the Court implied 
that only prior judicial reversals on Brady grounds can provide notice of 
prior noncompliance with Brady.57  It cited no authority and no rationale 
for confining itself to judicial reversals while ignoring multiple other 
avenues for discovering office non-compliance or the need for training of 
subordinates.  Demanding judicial reversals sets a bar that is not only 
unprecedented but onerously high in Brady cases.  Even when prosecutors 
are caught hiding evidence, courts will reverse a conviction only if the 
evidence was so strong that its disclosure would have created a reasonable 
probability of a different verdict, “[a]nd catching prosecutors who have 
engaged in such deception can be extremely difficult.”58
 
 53. See Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 845–46 (5th Cir. 2008), vacated, 578 F.3d 
293 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011); see also Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 
1374–76, 1376 n.10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
  The Chicago 
 54. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1376. 
 55. Id. at 1355–56 (majority opinion). 
 56. Id. at 1356. 
 57. See id. at 1360. 
 58. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict:  Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 
1999, at C1 [hereinafter Armstrong & Possley, The Verdict]; see also Robert P. Mosteller, 
Failures of the Prosecutor’s Duty to “Do Justice” in Extraordinary and Ordinary 
Miscarriages of Justice, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna & 
Marianne Wade eds.) (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 13) (on file with the Fordham Law 
Review) (“[W]ithout broad disclosure requirements, the extent of injustice will remain 
hidden, unaddressed, and without correction.”). See generally Ken Armstrong & Maurice 
Possley, Trial & Error:  How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win (pts. 1–5), CHI. TRIB., 
Jan. 10–14, 1999, at C1 [hereinafter Armstrong & Possley, Trial & Error].  As one amicus 
brief points out, the barriers to discovery would be even higher in situations where an inmate 
who suspected a Brady violation was unrepresented by counsel. Brief of Amicus Curiae the 
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Tribune described a number of cases in which evidence came to light years 
after a conviction, and by happenstance.  In one such case, “evidence 
undermining the state’s case surfaced only after being stolen from a 
prosecutor’s office by a man dating the prosecutor’s secretary.”59  The 
wrongly convicted man had at that point served twenty-one years in 
prison.60  “Evidence has surfaced in other cases only after a judge directed 
the U.S. marshal to seize the prosecutors’ documents, or because 
newspapers sued under the Freedom of Information Act, or because of 
anonymous tips, conversations accidentally overheard or papers spied in a 
prosecutor’s hand.”61
C.  Prior Brady Violations in Connick’s Office 
 
In Connick’s office, there were multiple other warnings that the office 
was out of compliance in ways that were leading to predictable Brady 
violations—warnings and condemnations that it received and ignored 
repeatedly.62  But even by the Court’s own measure, there were significant 
warnings.  By the time of Thompson’s trial in 1994, Connick’s eleven-year 
regime had already led to four other judicial reversals on Brady grounds—
four other cases in which the failure to turn over Brady evidence came to 
light and was serious enough to warrant reversal.63
But the Court proceeded to set the bar higher still, rejecting the 
significance of these four reversals because they involved the failure to turn 
over different types of evidence—for example, an arrest report rather than a 
crime lab report; a report about a weapon rather than blood evidence.  Yet 
this distinction based on types of evidence rather than the scope of 
obligations does not track the usual categories of Brady training,
 
64
 
National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Respondent at 25–28, Connick v. 
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (No. 09-571), 2010 WL 3198842, at *25–28. 
 or 
 59. Armstrong & Possley, The Verdict, supra note 58, at C1. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., id. (noting that Connick’s office was condemned repeatedly for 
withholding evidence, and detailing specific warnings to the office to change its behavior in 
this regard); see also Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1382 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that after 
the Supreme Court decision in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), which featured many 
instances of the State of Louisiana’s failure to discover exculpatory evidence, Connick stated 
that he saw no need to make any changes); id. at 1375 (describing Connick’s decision to 
abort grand jury proceedings against the prosecutors who had withheld the lab report in 
Thompson’s case after one day because the grand jury “w[ould] make [his] job more 
difficult”); id. at 1387 (noting that Connick himself had previously been indicted for 
suppression of evidence); Brief of the Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 25, Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (No. 09-571), 2010 WL 
3232485, at *25 (stating that of the thirty-six capital convictions during Connick’s tenure, 
more than half of those convicted subsequently asserted that Connick’s office withheld 
Brady material; courts found that evidence had been improperly withheld in nine of those 
nineteen cases). 
 63. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360 (majority opinion). 
 64. See, e.g., R.C. PHILLIPS, SAN DIEGO CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, BRADY TRAINING 
BULLETIN, available at http://www.sdsheriff.net/legalupdates/docs/bradytrainingbulletin.pdf 
(setting forth Brady obligations by categories of favorable evidence included in Brady, such 
as “[e]vidence directly opposing guilt,” “[e]vidence indirectly opposing guilt,” “[e]vidence 
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address the sorts of misconceptions about Brady that generally arise65 or 
that are at issue in this case.66
D.  Violation of Thompson’s Rights:  A Group Effort 
 
The majority and concurrence applied a similar methodology to the series 
of decisions by several prosecutors in regard to this particular case:  the 
decisions of the attorneys who tried the case to withhold Brady evidence 
and to deliberately avoid mentioning that evidence at trial, and the decision 
of Riehlmann to keep quiet after hearing a deathbed confession regarding 
Thompson, even as Thompson sat on death row facing imminent execution.  
That several prosecutors not only failed to turn over the evidence, but also 
covered up the failure to do so, suggests an office culture that breeds 
noncompliance with Brady.  Justice Thomas pared all this information 
down to a single incident, insufficient to provide notice to the policymaker, 
through several methods of disaggregation.  He dismissed every action 
subsequent to the initial failure to turn over the evidence—in other words 
the entire cover-up that kept Thompson locked up for eighteen years—as 
“contemporaneous or subsequent conduct [that] cannot establish a pattern” 
because it provided no notice to the entity and no opportunity for the entity 
to conform to constitutional dictates.67  But of course Thompson did not 
complain only about his initial conviction.  He complained about the entire 
course of conduct that kept him imprisoned for eighteen years, on death row 
for fourteen, and facing execution dates on five occasions.  As Justice 
Ginsburg said, the prosecutors hid material they were constitutionally 
obligated to turn over, not only before or during the trial, but well after it.  
They did so “despite multiple opportunities, spanning nearly two decades, 
to set the record straight.”68
The Court dismissed the four previous Brady violations during Connick’s 
tenure (which included a high profile Supreme Court reversal of the work 
of Jim Williams, also one of the prosecutors in this case).
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supporting defense testimony,” “[e]vidence supporting a defense motion that would weaken 
the prosecution’s case,” and “[e]vidence impeaching a prosecution witness’s credibility,” 
rather than by type of document (crime lab report) or type of evidence (blood evidence)). 
  The Court held 
 65. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
in Support of Respondent, supra note 58, at 21–22 (detailing recurrent issues that include 
whether impeachment evidence is exculpatory, whether evidence must be disclosed, whether 
evidence that is not exculpatory by itself but might exonerate the defendant if combined with 
other evidence known by defense or ascertainable by the prosecution must be disclosed, how 
materiality is measured, and whether materiality is judged cumulatively or based on each 
individual piece of evidence). 
 66. For example, there was confusion in the office about whether evidence impeaching 
credibility was governed by Brady, and in addition Connick himself incorrectly believed that 
inadvertent conduct is excusable under Brady. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1375 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 67. See id. at 1360 n.7 (majority opinion) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 
395 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 68. Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 69. In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), the Supreme Court reversed a capital 
murder conviction because of the failure of Connick’s office to comply with Brady. See also 
Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 9, Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (No. 
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that any pattern of violations must be a pattern of failure to train about this 
particular type of Brady evidence, or about “the specific scenario related to 
the violation in his case.”70  It dismissed as irrelevant the failure to turn 
over, prior to Thompson’s murder trial, thirteen additional pieces of 
evidence—evidence which, once in his possession, helped Thompson win 
an acquittal at his murder retrial.71  It classified those thirteen pieces of 
evidence as irrelevant because there was no explicit finding that the 
evidence was Brady material.72
E.  How the Court Contrived to Turn a Blind Eye 
to the Office’s Culture of Indifference 
  These are, in the light most favorable to the 
majority, interpretive choices that skew relentlessly in one direction. 
But the final and most devastating choice lies buried in a footnote and is 
hard to defend under any interpretive criteria.  In this footnote the Court 
explained its refusal to consider the argument that Connick created a culture 
of indifference in the District Attorney’s Office, stating, “This argument is 
essentially an assertion that Connick’s office had an unconstitutional policy 
or custom.  The jury rejected this claim, and Thompson does not challenge 
that finding.”73  The majority’s assertion is a serious misstatement of both 
the record and the law.74  As the Court has consistently held from Monell 
onward, there are only two avenues for finding municipal liability—a 
policy emanating from the policymaker, which includes a policy of failure 
to train, or a custom shown by a pattern of subordinate misconduct.  The 
jury found that the entity had no explicit policy on Brady compliance, but it 
found that Connick’s office had a policy of failure to adequately train, 
within the meaning of the governing precedents, Canton v. Harris and 
Bryan County v. Brown.75
 
09-571), 2010 WL 3167311, at *9 (“Ironically, Kyles concerned the conduct of Jim 
Williams, the very same prosecutor who played a leading role in both of Thompson’s 
convictions.”). 
  Thus there is no defensible argument for 
excluding evidence that Connick’s office created a culture of indifference—
a culture that created and illustrated the need for training and supervision. 
 70. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355 (majority opinion). 
 71. See id. at 1364 n.11. 
 72. See id. But see id. at 1377 n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining the lack of an 
explicit finding that failure to turn over these additional pieces of evidence violated Brady). 
 73. Id. at 1364 n.10 (majority opinion). 
 74. The instructions permitted the jury to find a policy on two separate grounds, either as 
an “official policy,” or alternatively through a failure, “through deliberate indifference, to 
establish policies and procedures to protect one accused of a crime from these constitutional 
violations[.]” Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 2008), vacated, 578 F.3d 
293 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).  The first ground appears to ask 
the jury to find an explicit policy, and the Fifth Circuit assumed that this is how the jury 
interpreted it. See Thompson, 553 F.3d at 851. 
 75. See, e.g., Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (“Only where a failure to train 
reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality—a ‘policy’ as defined by our 
prior cases—can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983.”). 
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III.  ERASING THE ENTITY:  THE MYTH OF THE SELF-TRAINING, 
SELF-REGULATING PROSECUTOR 
The Connick Court atomized not only the prosecutorial misconduct at 
issue but also the prosecutor’s office as an entity.  In the office depicted in 
the majority and concurring opinions, each assistant prosecutor is an island 
entire unto himself.76
The Court’s faith in the self-regulating prosecutor is contradicted by 
ample evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, some of it willful, but much of 
it unintentional.
  The Court ascribed each incident of misconduct 
solely to the individual, and assumed that each prosecutor is responsible for 
his own training and regulation.  It repeatedly erased and ignored the 
dynamics of the governmental entity and the role of the entity in setting, 
communicating, and enforcing standards of conduct.  The Connick opinion 
rejected the need for prosecutorial training based on assumptions about the 
ability of assistant prosecutors to train themselves in the law and adhere to 
ethical rules—assumptions that are most generously described as wishful 
thinking. 
77  Moreover, the Court’s portrayal of the prosecutor as an 
autonomous, self-directing agent ignores the substantial and growing body 
of knowledge about how bureaucratic structure influences ethical decision 
making.78
A.  Misplaced Reliance on a Prosecutor’s Professional Training and 
Ethical Obligations 
  This body of knowledge, coupled with a rich literature about the 
particular ethical challenges of the prosecutor’s office and how they are best 
addressed, illuminates the tremendous importance of training and the 
misguided nature of the Court’s approach. 
The Court holds that absent a pattern of violations, “a district attorney is 
entitled to rely on prosecutors’ professional training and ethical 
obligations.”79
 
 76. See John Donne, Meditation 17, in SERMONS ON THE PSALMS AND GOSPELS 243 
(Evelyn M. Simpson, ed. 1963) (“No man is an island entire of itself.”). 
  In a vote of confidence for legal education that should strike 
fear in the heart of every law professor, the Court held that whereas police 
might need some training before they are sent out into the street with guns, 
prosecutors learn what they need to know in law school.  Even if they do 
not actually learn about Brady in law school (and the vast majority do not, 
since criminal procedure is not usually a required course, and the 
introductory criminal procedure course does not usually cover Brady in any 
case), they obtain the tools they need to learn about Brady on their own, or 
with the help of Continuing Legal Education courses, when the time comes.  
And to the extent prosecutors have an ethical obligation to turn over Brady 
evidence, the Court is reassured that they, like all lawyers admitted to 
practice, have also satisfied character and fitness standards, that those who 
 77. See infra notes 96–103 and accompanying text (discussing intentional and 
unintentional violations). 
 78. See infra notes 91–103 and accompanying text. 
 79. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1363 (2011). 
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violate ethics rules are subject to discipline, and that prosecutors have a 
special ethical obligation to do justice as well as to seek conviction. 
The air of unreality that pervades the majority’s descriptions of the 
prosecutorial function is palpable.  As a foundational matter, it is bizarre to 
assume that a professional degree obviates the need for specialized 
training.80  But more specifically, there is ample evidence that the honor 
system the Court advocates has not proved a viable option for the training 
and discipline of prosecutors.  It is well documented that prosecutorial 
misconduct, prominently including the violation of Brady obligations, is not 
only all too common, but a leading cause of wrongful convictions.81  It is 
also well documented that discipline of prosecutors is rare almost to the 
vanishing point, so discipline cannot be relied upon as a deterrent to or 
remedy for misconduct.82
B.  Training and Institutional Dynamics 
 
When institutional dynamics are made part of the equation, the need for 
training becomes clear.  Norms of ethical conduct, for prosecutors or other 
professionals, are not inert precepts transmitted in a vacuum.  They are 
understood, given shape, and refined in institutional and social contexts, 
through both implicit and explicit means, through official choices to act and 
official choices to refrain from action.83  Institutions are uniquely placed to 
shape and guide moral intuitions—for better or for worse.  They provide 
systematic feedback through the provision of incentives and disincentives 
that convey the norms of acceptable and unacceptable behavior.84
 
 80. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers in 
Support of Respondent, supra note 
  Thus it 
58, at 16 (analogizing this argument to taking a general 
medical practitioner with no training in surgery, placing him in a clinic, and expecting him to 
rely on attendance at medical school, on the job training, and professional responsibility to 
provide competent care). 
 81. See Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged:  The Prosecutorial Charging 
Decision and the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2187 (2010); see also 
Chemerinsky, supra note 6 (reporting on a recent study by the Northern California 
Innocence Project at Santa Clara University Law School documenting frequency of 
misconduct); Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 
BYU L. REV. 53, 59–64 (discussing several major studies detailing frequency of prejudicial 
prosecutorial misconduct). See generally Armstrong & Possley, Trial & Error, supra note 
58. 
 82. See Armstrong & Possley, Trial & Error, supra note 58 (discussing rarity with 
which prosecutors are disciplined); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Ass’n of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Respondent, supra note 58, at 32 (citing New York 
and California task forces, which concluded that “prosecutorial misconduct is a substantial 
cause of wrongful convictions, errant prosecutors are virtually never disciplined, and the 
widespread lack of discipline causes such misconduct to occur”); Johns, supra note 81, at 71 
(discussing the lack of safeguards against or consequences for prosecutorial misconduct). 
See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 721 (2001) (discussing why discipline of prosecutors is so rare). 
 83. See generally Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:  A Critique, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 2271 (1990) (critiquing use of action/inaction distinction in determining governmental 
accountability). 
 84. GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS:  THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 197–98 
(2007). 
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is essential to look to the implicit and explicit norms of the institution and 
determine what sorts of ethical rules are being transmitted and reinforced. 
Institutions shape ethical behavior by rewarding or punishing awareness 
of ethical conflict, and by rewarding or punishing those who take the 
initiative to confront such conflicts.  When the workplace creates a conflict 
between ethical behavior and institutional values, or implicitly condones or 
overlooks unethical behavior that advances institutional goals, ethical 
behavior tends to lose out.  The choice rarely operates on a conscious level.  
“Left to our own devices, without feedback or correction, we are likely to 
believe what is self-protective or self-deceptive.  We are not particularly 
good at identifying and correcting our own assumptions, biases and blind 
spots . . . .”85  The problem is not only that people articulate self-protective 
and self-defensive excuses; they also have every incentive to believe 
them.86  People too often tend to reconfigure their notions of what counts as 
ethical so they do not have to confront the tension between doing good and 
doing well, or the acute discomfort of regarding themselves as unethical.87  
Institutions that encourage employees to avert their eyes from questionable 
behavior, or to place the protection of the entity above the observance of 
ethical obligations, exacerbate this tendency toward self-protection and 
support self-deception.88  Psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer calls these “split 
brain institution[s].”89  For those who work in such institutions, self-
protective behavior gradually ceases to be viewed as unethical and begins to 
look acceptable and even desirable.90
C.  Institutional Dynamics in Prosecutors’ Offices—and Why They Make 
Brady Training Essential 
 
This dynamic—the convenient reconfiguring of the notion of ethical 
behavior—is one the prosecutor’s office has to guard against with particular 
vigilance, due to the inherent tension between the prosecutor’s dual role as 
advocate and minister of justice.91
 
 85. Susan A. Bandes, Is It Immoral to Punish the Heedless and Clueless?  A Comment 
on Alexander, Ferzan and Morse:  Crime and Culpability, 29 L. & PHIL. 433, 446 (2010). 
  When the institutional incentives 
emphasize only one aspect of that dual role—the role of the adversary 
zealously focused on obtaining convictions—the consequences are entirely 
predictable.  Prosecutors are frequently faced with hard ethical choices, and 
the admonition to do justice is vague enough to seem to justify, or at least 
 86. Id. at 445. 
 87. See Susan A. Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions:  The Prosecutor and Tunnel 
Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475, 490–92 (2006) (describing the dynamics of avoiding cognitive 
dissonance when prosecutors are faced with ethical conflicts). 
 88. See GIGERENZER, supra note 84, at 198–99. 
 89. Id. at 198. 
 90. See Max H. Bazerman & Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Op-Ed., Stumbling Into Bad Behavior, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2011, at A27 (discussing the “ethical fading” that enables people to 
behave unethically and overlook the unethical behavior of others while maintaining a 
positive self-image in situations in which there is a tendency toward “motivated blindness” 
about information that works against self-interest or the interest of the employer). 
 91. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:  
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46 (1991). 
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excuse, a wide range of actions.  After a while a choice may appear less as 
an ethical quandary and more as a justifiable action to help victims, to keep 
bad people off the street, and to “protect the reputation of the agency itself 
so that it can continue to do its important work.”92  Such all too human 
tendencies to do what is expected and what is rewarded can be 
counteracted, or they can be exacerbated, by the norms and expectations of 
the institution.  In some cases these norms are transmitted, at least in theory, 
by written policies or legal constraints.  More often, “administrative norms 
are clearly communicated through less traceable channels93 . . . through the 
behavior of . . . colleagues and supervisors, through observing how things 
are done, what is rewarded, what is punished, and what is ignored.”94  And 
indeed it is commonplace that obtaining convictions tends to be the key to 
prosecutorial advancement.  As Daniel Medwed put it, “A series of factors 
cause trial prosecutors to view their jobs primarily through the lens of 
gaining ‘wins’ (convictions) and avoiding ‘losses’ (acquittals).”95
D.  Deterrence and State of Mind 
 
Prosecutors may violate Brady intentionally or unintentionally.  Either 
type of violation is deterrable.96  Many of the problems that lead to Brady 
violations and other constitutional infringements arise not from identifiable 
individual intentions, but from incentive structures deeply imbedded in the 
culture of the office—incentive structures that exacerbate existing 
tendencies toward self-protection and self-deception.97
 
 92. See Bandes, supra note 
  Recent research on 
cognitive processing helps explain how police and prosecutors can take 
actions that violate rights and lead to wrongful convictions without exactly 
87, at 487. 
 93. The failure to promulgate specific policies protects policymaking official and keeps 
responsibility and blame at low levels. Bandes, supra note 42, at 1329 (“It perpetuates the 
appearance that street level officers are making autonomous, disconnected decisions.”). 
 94. See id. 
 95. Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice:  Preaching to the 
Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 44 (2009). 
 96. In the exclusionary rule context, the Court has frequently assumed that negligent acts 
are unlikely to be deterrable, and that intentional acts are the best candidates for deterrence. 
See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009); United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 916–17 (1984).  For a critique of this view, see generally SUSAN A. BANDES, AM. 
CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE (2009), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Bandes%
20Issue%20Brief.pdf.  In Connick, conversely, the “miscreant prosecutor Gerry Deegan’s 
willful suppression of evidence he believed to be exculpatory” is treated as non-deterrable. 
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1368 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).  But as the 
Court seems to recognize in the exclusionary rule context, if Deegan had foreseen any 
negative consequences from his intentional suppression of evidence, he may have behaved 
quite differently. See Tony Mauro, Stevens Criticizes Ruling on Prosecutorial Immunity, 
BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (May 3, 2011, 4:14 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/
blt/2011/05/stevens-criticizes-ruling-on-prosecutorial-immunity.html (reporting on Justice 
Stevens’s argument that training and supervision can affect intentional misconduct as well). 
 97. Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment 
of Mike Nifong:  The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 257, 309–11 (2008) (discussing the problems arising from the focus on prosecutorial 
intent in determining discipline for Brady violations). 
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“knowing” they are doing so.98  For example, a number of scholars have 
written about the problem of prosecutorial tunnel vision.  Tunnel vision can 
be explained as a species of cognitive bias that causes prosecutors to screen 
out information that might cast doubt on the accuracy of their initial version 
of events.  It “infects all phases of criminal proceedings, beginning with the 
investigation of cases and then proceeding through the prosecution, trial or 
plea-bargaining, appeal, and post conviction stages.”99  Tunnel vision can 
be a particular problem when a prosecutor must make decisions about what 
counts as Brady material based on elastic concepts such as materiality, 
which require “weighing a single piece of potentially exculpatory evidence 
against all inculpating evidence, the totality of which may seem especially 
powerful in the investigative stage.”100  A prosecutor is likely to believe in 
the strength of her own case and the guilt of the suspect,101
[F]or a prosecutor who has reached the conclusion that the accused is 
guilty . . . there can be no true exculpatory evidence.  If it is truly 
exculpatory, the case should be dismissed, or that thought should be 
seriously entertained.  Otherwise, the evidence must be not really 
exculpatory, and therefore, is simply useful ammunition for the defense in 
the adversary battle of the criminal trial.
 and this belief 
may color her judgment about the relative importance of potentially 
exculpatory evidence in her file.  As Robert Mosteller recently described: 
102
Tunnel vision and other cognitive biases may not operate on a wholly 
conscious level, but that does not mean they are impervious to influence.  
On the contrary, even biases that are not entirely conscious may be 
amenable to change when the incentive structures make change desirable, 
or refusal to change undesirable.  If assistant prosecutors discovered that 
unconstitutional conduct caused them to lose opportunities for promotion or 
salary increases, or to lose the respect of their colleagues and the support of 
their superiors, they might weigh costs and benefits differently or take 
additional steps to avoid misconduct.  Or “if elected prosecutors found that 
wrongful convictions . . . subjected them to sanctions, or their offices to 
 
 
 98. See generally Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making:  Some 
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006); Barbara O’Brien, A 
Recipe for Bias:  An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and 
Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999 (2009). 
 99. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 295; accord Bandes, supra note 87, at 481–83. 
 100. Amici Curiae Brief of the Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, New York 
University School of Law et al. at 11, Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (No. 
09-571), 2010 WL 3251771, at *11. 
 101. Indeed, the command to do justice suggests that the prosecutor should not proceed 
unless convinced on some level of the suspect’s guilt, and thus to proceed without such a 
belief creates both an ethical dilemma and perhaps some cognitive dissonance. See 
Mosteller, supra note 97, at 309; see also Bandes, supra note 87, at 488. 
 102. See Mosteller, supra note 97, at 309. 
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litigation, they might take a hard look at the incentive structure of the office 
and whether it provides a meaningful check on tunnel vision.”103
At oral argument in Connick, members of the Court declared themselves 
perplexed by the question of what kind of training prosecutors could have 
been provided that might have made a difference.
 
104
Connick plainly recognized, while he was D.A., that law school graduates 
had to be trained in numerous areas of responsibility before they would be 
qualified to handle significant criminal cases.  Indeed, Connick, in his 
brief, congratulates himself on the extensive training and supervision his 
new prosecutors received in virtually every type of function.  There was 
just one area missing:  Brady.  That Connick would recognize the need to 
instruct prosecutors in virtually every facet of prosecution, but provide no 
training about compliance with Brady, was a powerful piece of evidence 
before the jury proving his deliberate indifference to whether such 
compliance actually occurred.  Obtaining convictions obviously mattered 
far more.
  Instead of insisting on 
a precise account of the substantive content of the training that should have 
been offered, the Court should have focused on a much more important 
point about the absence of training in Connick’s office.  Training, not just in 
its content but in the very fact that it occurs, communicates important 
messages about the expectations and culture of the office.  As one amicus 
brief argued: 
105
Certainly explicit instruction sends important signals, and Connick’s 
instruction to work to rule—to give only what was absolutely required—
sent an important signal about the attitude of the office, particularly when 
coupled with a lack of accurate information about exactly what was 
required.
 
106  So did the fact that the office rarely if ever disciplined anyone 
for violating Brady,107
 
 103. Susan A. Bandes, Framing Wrongful Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 5, 21–22; see 
also Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages:  The Tale of Brady v. 
Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 659–60 (2002). 
 and that compliance with norms of fair play 
appeared to have no connection to, or even a negative impact upon, 
professional advancement.  A culture is communicated through deed, 
gesture, attitude, intonation, and all sorts of intangibles.  It is communicated 
 104. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 39, at 29–36.  The majority opinion, having 
declared that only a lack of training on the specific type of claim or scenario at issue should 
matter, went on to say that it would be inappropriate for the Court to micromanage 
prosecutors’ offices by telling them exactly what to cover in their training regimes. Connick 
v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1363 (2011).  But the specter of micromanagement is a 
function of the Court’s own hyper-literal way of dicing up the training failure at issue.  
Another way to think about what happened is the way Justice Ginsburg described it:  
“[M]embers of the District Attorney’s Office, including the District Attorney himself, 
misperceived Brady’s compass and therefore inadequately attended to their disclosure 
obligations.” Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 105. Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support 
of Respondent, supra note 58, at 18 (citations omitted). 
 106. See generally Mosteller, supra note 97 (arguing that mistakes are inevitable in the 
absence of open file discovery). 
 107. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1382 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that nobody had 
ever been disciplined by Connick for a Brady violation). 
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by the decision not to spend valuable office time on training about 
discovery obligations. 
The Court in Connick held that “[a] district attorney is entitled to rely on 
prosecutors’ professional training and ethical obligations in the absence of 
specific reason, such as a pattern of violations, to believe that those tools 
are insufficient to prevent future constitutional violations in the usual and 
recurring situations with which [the prosecutors] must deal.”108  Yet when 
all the incentives align to encourage the prosecutor to ignore his role as a 
minister of justice, the result is entirely predictable, and the policymaker, 
quite simply, should not be “entitled to rely on prosecutors’ professional 
training and ethical obligations.”109
IV.  THE SECTION 1983 COMPENSATORY SCHEME AS SHELL GAME 
  Such reliance under the circumstances 
amounts to willful blindness, and unfortunately the Connick opinion makes 
the choice of willful blindness cost-free. 
Most problematic about the majority opinion in Connick is that, quite 
simply, it never once addresses the goals of § 1983, which are commonly 
held to be compensation and deterrence.  The entire burden of the majority 
opinion is to establish the narrowness of failure to train entity liability.  
Like a C+ law school exam, Justice Thomas’s majority opinion treats this as 
a doctrinal question that can be discussed in a vacuum, without ever 
addressing the underlying purposes of the statute the Court is charged with 
construing.110
It is instructive to compare the current Supreme Court’s approach to that 
in Owen v. City of Independence,
 
111
 
 108. Id. at 1363 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 the 1980 case deciding that under 
§ 1983, municipal entities were not entitled to immunity from suit.  The 
language of the opinion, and indeed the legislative history on which the 
opinion relies, sound sadly quaint today.  The Court quoted Representative 
Shallabarger (the bill’s author), who said about the proper construction of 
the statute:  “This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human 
liberty and human rights.  All statutes and constitutional provisions 
authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed.  It would 
be most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the rule of 
 109. Id. 
 110. Justice Scalia’s concurrence is similarly focused on the dangers of an expansive 
view of failure to train liability.  It goes further by apparently claiming that Brady was not 
violated in any event, because prosecutors never followed up to determine what Thompson’s 
blood type was, and therefore remained ignorant of whether the blood evidence would in fact 
be exculpatory. Id. at 1369 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Confusingly, Justice Scalia also indicates 
that Deegan’s failure to turn over evidence that he himself believed exculpatory did violate 
Brady, evidently by virtue of its bad faith nature. Id.  Although Brady makes the good or bad 
faith of the State irrelevant, Justice Scalia is apparently treating Deegan’s failure as a failure 
to preserve evidentiary material rather than a failure to turn over exculpatory evidence, on 
the theory that absent knowledge of Thompson’s blood type, the evidence should not be 
considered exculpatory.  He notes that bad faith is relevant to claims of failure to preserve 
evidence that, if subjected to tests, might lead to results that exonerate the defendant. Id. 
 111. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). 
734 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
interpretation.”112  The Owen Court went on to observe that given the 
statute’s central aim to provide protection to those wronged by the misuse 
of power, it would be “‘uniquely amiss’ . . . if the government itself . . . 
were permitted to disavow liability for the injury it has begotten.”113
One major factor cited by the Owen Court in favor of rejecting municipal 
immunity was its concern that if the entity could block suit by asserting 
immunity, the statute’s compensatory aims would be thwarted, since entity 
liability coupled with individual immunities would leave victims of 
municipal wrongdoing completely remediless.
 
114
Since Monroe v. Pape,
  Under the Owen Court’s 
approach to interpreting § 1983, Van de Kamp’s grant of absolute immunity 
to individual prosecutors should be viewed as a reason for entity liability, 
not against it.  Without entity liability, Thompson is left remediless, exactly 
the unjust situation Owen warned against.  Likewise, letting Connick’s 
office off the hook does violence to the deterrent aims of the statute and 
removes any incentive for prosecutors to institute rules and programs 
designed to minimize the likelihood of violating rights.  One searches the 
Connick majority opinion and the Scalia concurrence in vain for any 
discussion of the need to allocate the costs of constitutional harm, or any 
recognition of the perverse incentives created by the Court’s holding. 
115 the Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence has 
recognized that explicit written law—“the law on the books”—is not the 
only actionable source of liability.  It has recognized that law can be 
adequate in theory but not in practice—as indeed it was with the failures to 
prosecute the Klan that were a central impetus for the statute.116  The Court 
has struggled to steer clear of respondeat superior liability117
 
 112. Id. at 636 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 1ST SESS. 68 (1871)). 
 while fleshing 
out the contours of a municipal liability jurisprudence that does not simply 
immunize policymakers for having a facially constitutional policy in place 
and proceeding to allow every subordinate official to ignore it at will.   
 113. Id. at 651 (citing Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190 (1970) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 114. Id. (“[M]any victims of municipal malfeasance would be left remediless if the city 
were also allowed to assert a good-faith defense.”). 
 115. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 116. Id. at 178. 
 117. Though it is beyond the scope of this Article, the question of whether the refusal to 
apply respondeat superior liability is yet another misreading of the ambiguous statutory 
history, specifically the meaning of the 1871 Congress’s rejection of the Sherman 
Amendment, is an important one. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834–
41 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing for the adoption of respondeat superior liability 
in § 1983 cases, and asserting that the rejection of the Sherman Amendment, on which the 
Court relies in rejecting respondeat superior liability, establishes only that the 1871 Congress 
did not mean to hold governmental entities liable for the acts of private parties of which it 
had no notice, an entirely separate proposition from holding government liable for the acts of 
its own employees); see also Donald L. Doernberg, Taking Supremacy Seriously:  The 
Contrariety of Official Immunities, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 443 (2011) (arguing that the 
rejection of the Sherman Amendment should not have been construed to preclude respondeat 
superior liability); Mauro, supra note 96 (reporting on a speech by retired Justice Stevens 
criticizing the Connick decision and arguing that § 1983 municipal liability ought to be 
extended to permit respondeat superior liability, either by judicial interpretation or by an act 
of Congress amending the statute). 
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 Connick comes uncomfortably close to endorsing precisely this latter 
course of action.  At oral argument, members of the Court saw no problem 
with a policy that instructed prosecutors simply to turn over what was 
required and nothing more.  If assistant prosecutors misconstrued such a 
policy, the fault would be assumed to lie with them until the number of 
violations of Brady by subordinates reached the level of custom.  The 
policy itself, despite its lack of accompanying training and its direction to 
err on the side of withholding evidence, could not be at fault because, as the 
majority holds:  “A district attorney is entitled to rely on prosecutors’ 
professional training and ethical obligations in the absence of specific 
reason, such as a pattern of violations, to believe that those tools are 
insufficient to prevent future constitutional violations in the usual and 
recurring situations with which [the prosecutors] must deal.”118
The failure to train cases arose from the realization that unless there is an 
incentive to do otherwise, policymakers are likely to choose a facially legal 
but widely ignored policy, or simply adopt no policy at all.
 
119  In light of 
Connick, the incentives point toward adopting no policy on training or 
supervision.120  An office can take this route with impunity, and chalk up 
every deviation from the law as the isolated act of a rogue prosecutor until 
the deviations reach the level of custom.  This is the “gaping hole” problem 
the Court skirted in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik.121  If all responsibility is 
delegated to mid-level or street-level personnel, the policymaker may be 
insulated from liability as long as he has no unconstitutional policy in place.  
The Praprotnik Court optimistically assumed that “custom” would fill the 
liability gap.122
CONCLUSION 
  But Connick drives home how easily a court can 
disaggregate conduct so that a series of wrongful acts is construed as a 
random assortment of isolated incidents rather than the sort of pattern that 
should put a policymaker on notice. 
The Court in Owen v. City of Independence observed that § 1983 was 
meant to “encourage those in a policymaking position to institute internal 
rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood of unintentional 
 
 118. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1363 (2011) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 119. See Susan Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels and Davidson:  Distinguishing a Custom 
or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IOWA L. REV. 101, 155 & n.399 (1987) 
(discussing skewed governmental incentives toward inaction). 
 120. Justice Kagan asked in oral argument whether “the failure to train or supervise in 
any way and the setting up a structural system that’s pretty much guaranteed to produce 
Brady violations . . . would be enough” absent any actual violations.  The attorney for 
Connick’s office responded that it would not be enough absent a pattern of violations, and 
this seems to be the Court’s position in the Connick decision. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 39, at 13. 
 121. 485 U.S. 112, 131 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 122. See id. But see id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that custom and usage 
will not fill the gaping hole left by the decision’s reliance on official policy and refusal to 
recognize implicit delegation of policymaking authority). 
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infringements on constitutional rights,”123 and to encourage individual 
officials to err on the side of protecting rights.  For concrete examples of the 
costs of the other sort of regime—the sort that does not err on the side of 
protecting rights—one need look no further than the New Orleans Parish 
D.A.’s office.  The office ethos was to err on the side of non-disclosure.  
When it came to Brady, the top-down model was a failure to train, 
supervise, and discipline, and every incentive was skewed toward failure to 
act.  The resulting failures were therefore predictable—failure to follow up 
on a suspect’s blood type in the face of blood evidence, failure to turn over 
evidence, failure to disclose a deathbed confession that the wrong man was 
facing execution, failure to uphold the “minister of justice” aspect of the 
prosecutor’s dual role.  For a Court concerned with the compensatory, 
deterrent, and declaratory aims of § 1983, placing its imprimatur on such a 
regime should be difficult to justify.  But as Justice Scalia tellingly reveals 
in his concurrence, this Court considers constitutional violations 
inevitable.124
 
  The sad irony is that in refusing to act, the Court fulfills its 
own prophecy.  It helps ensure that the incentives to violate Brady remain 
robust, and therefore that Brady violations will remain inevitable.  The 
Connick Court is haunted by the specter of too much liability.  The 
opposing nightmare scenario—a remedial vacuum for egregious 
constitutional violations—is acknowledged only in dissent. 
 
 123. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980). 
 124. “Brady mistakes are inevitable.  So are all species of error routinely confronted by 
prosecutors. . . .  [T]he District Court’s instructions cover every recurring situation in which 
citizens’ rights can be violated.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1367 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
